

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTEENTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Monday 25 March 1963, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman

Mr. M. T. IBU

(Nigeria)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A.A. de MELO FRANCO
Mr. J. MACHADO LOPES
Mr. J. FRANK da COSTA

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV
Mr. G. GUELEV
Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV
Mr. V. IZMIRLIEV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON
U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. S.F. RAE
Mr. A.E. GOTLIEB
Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. K. KURKA
Mr. V. VAJNAR
Mr. J. BLAZIK

Ethiopia:

Lij Mikael IMRU
Ato M. HAMID
Ato M. GHEBEYEHU

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL
Mr. A.S. MEHTA
Mr. S.B. DESHKAR

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI
Mr. G. COSTA-REGHINI
Mr. P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PIDILLA NERVO
Miss E. AGUIRRE
Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. M.T. MBU
Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTJN
Mr. E. STANIENSKI
Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU
Mr. E. GLASER
Mr. N. ECOBESCU
Mr. O. NEDAI

Sweden:

Baron C.H. von PLATEN
Mr. E. CORNELL

Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSIRAPKIN
Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
Mr. I.G. USACHEV
Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN
Mr. S. AHMED
Mr. M. KASSEM
Mr. S.E. IBRAHIM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBER
Sir Paul MASON
Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN
Mr. D.N. BRINSON

United States of America

Mr. C.C. STELLE
Mr. A.L. RICHARDS
Mr. V. BAKER
Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Deputy Special Representative of
the Secretary-General:

Mr. M.A. VELLODI

The CHAIRMAN (Nigeria): I declare open the one hundred and thirteenth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): In accordance with the recommendation of the co-Chairmen (ENDC/PV.108, p.34) adopted by the Committee, our meeting today is scheduled to be devoted to consideration of a nuclear test ban treaty; and in that connexion I should like this morning to go on with a further discussion of the arrangements for the conduct of on-site inspection. At our meeting on 18 March my delegation summarized (ENDC/PV.110, pp.19 et seq.) the United States view of the inspection process up to the point at which an on-site inspection team actually enters the host country's territory. Today we wish to continue that discussion through the completion of the on-site inspection process. First, however, I should like to review some of the basic points now at issue in our negotiations.

My delegation has stated its belief that there are a number of issues concerning on-site inspection on which negotiations should now take place. The Soviet delegation has insisted that there is only one such issue -- namely, the number of on-site inspections and the number of automatic seismic stations. In addition, the Soviet delegation has stated that there can be only one basis for agreement on this one question -- that is, the numbers which the Soviet Government has proposed.

We cannot accept the position of the Soviet Union, although we can agree that one of the issues, and an important issue, which must be the subject of negotiation is the number of on-site inspections. We have no difference with the Soviet representative on that score. Where we do differ, however, is over what other issues must be taken into consideration with respect to on-site inspection. The Soviet Union continues to say that there should be no discussion of the other important broad issues. We, however, believe that it must be clear to all delegations what an on-site inspection is before even a tentative agreement on the number of on-site inspections can be meaningful. As I have noted at past meetings, in connexion with the quota of on-site inspections we wish specifically to know the Soviet answer to the question, "The number of what?".

The answer to that question will concern the problem of inspection arrangements or, as we have come to call them here, modalities. My delegation has tried at our past

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meetings to make clear what we believe are the essential arrangements for on-site inspection -- the broad issues which will help us to arrive at a meaningful number of on-site inspections. We have earnestly sought and now seek the views of the Soviet delegation on those issues. There are not many of them, as we have made clear in the past. Soviet comments on certain of them might be limited to a "Yes" or "No" answer to the questions we have asked both privately and in plenary meetings of this Conference. Let me review for members of the Committee for a moment some of those broad issues.

First, there is the question of how seismic events will be designated for inspection. Here we believe that other-side choice should be the principle according to which events are designated among the three nuclear Powers negotiating here. Employing the principle of other-side choice, the Soviet Union would designate events in the United Kingdom and the United States which it might later wish to inspect. The Soviet Union would have to submit pertinent seismic data indicating such an event. The data would have to meet agreed criteria on location. In addition, the Soviet Union would have to indicate that the event in the United Kingdom or the United States could not be identified as an earthquake according to another set of agreed treaty criteria. We still do not know where the Soviet Union stands on that issue.

Secondly, we have indicated in specific terms what criteria we should propose to follow with respect both to the location of an event and to its identification as an earthquake. The Soviet position on those criteria remains unclear. We hope soon to hear whether the Soviet Union accepts them or whether it has other criteria to propose.

Thirdly, we believe a State should have the right to select an event for inspection from among the designated events on the basis, again, of the principle of other-side choice. That would mean that the Soviet Union could select, within an annual quota of course, an event for inspection from among those which it had designated in the United Kingdom and the United States. We believe the selection process should be accomplished within a time limit. Again, the Soviet Union has yet to make clear its views on that question.

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Fourthly, we have proposed a new definition for the area within which the inspection would be carried out. The Soviet Union has not told us of its views on that proposal.

Fifthly, we have outlined our views on how an inspection team might be composed, its duties in the inspection zone, and the provisions which might be drawn up to ensure host country security during an inspection. We have proposed that teams be composed so that the other nuclear side would be represented by some fourteen highly-trained technical experts. In addition there would also be team members from States not members of either NATO or the Warsaw Pact. We have indicated our view that inspection teams should have guaranteed freedom of movement in the inspection area consistent with their purpose of searching for evidence of an underground nuclear weapon test or, more hopefully, for evidence that an event was not a test.

In addition, the United States delegation has offered certain safeguards to the host country during the period an inspection team is in transit to the inspection area. We have also made it clear that we are willing to permit host-country observers to accompany the team. Finally, we have proposed that sensitive defence installations could be excluded from the area which is to be inspected. The Soviet Union's position on those proposals remains unstated, and we earnestly hope that it will tell us how it feels on these issues.

As my delegation has indicated before, we intend earnestly to continue negotiations until agreement on a test ban is reached. We believe the best way to accomplish that is for each side to make its position clear, at least in general terms, and then we can engage in give-and-take negotiations on the significant points at issue. We continue to hope that the Soviet Union will find that that is a useful way in which to proceed. We hope, as well, that it will soon abandon its present rigid position on how, when and where we take the next step in our negotiations, and on the positions the United States and the United Kingdom must accept with regard to the sole issue on which the Soviet delegation will now negotiate.

In the continuing hope that we shall soon be in a position to negotiate reasonably upon the broad issues of the arrangements for on-site inspection, my delegation would like to place before the Conference certain additional portions of its position on the arrangements for on-site inspection. These points of clarification, I should repeat, relate solely to inspection in the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. They follow upon my delegation's statement at the meeting on 18 March. (ENDC/PV.110).

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

As I noted at that meeting, it is our view that, once an area is chosen for on-site inspection and notification is given of the time and place of arrival of the inspection teams, the host country should have five days in which to indicate the arrangements it would make for the reception of the team. The host country would be responsible for providing transportation for the team to the site of the inspection. In addition, of course, it would be permitted to institute all safeguards it considered necessary to assure its national security, subject only to the condition -- the natural condition -- that the inspection team should arrive promptly at the inspection area. Those safeguards could include the use of its own aircraft and pilots to transport the inspection team; provisions to ensure that the inspection team was not permitted to view the territory of the host country en route to the inspection site; the use of any flight routes which the host country might choose, consistent again with the prompt arrival of the team; and accompaniment of the team by host-country observers.

The team, as we indicated at the plenary meeting on 13 March (ENDC/PV.108, pp.7,8), would in our view consist partly of international staff members from countries not members of NATO or the Warsaw Pact, and partly of technical experts from the other nuclear side. The leader of the team would be from the other nuclear side. To ensure that certain functions of the team were carried out by highly-trained technical personnel in order to achieve the maximum deterrent and confidence-building effect in each on-site inspection, we foresee that certain specified personnel should be among those provided by the other nuclear side. We believe, as we have said, that at least fourteen technical experts from the other nuclear side would be required for inspection in the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States.

The precise composition of a particular inspection team would of course depend on many circumstances, including the location of the area to be inspected, climatic conditions, and local geology and land forms. For illustrative purposes we believe that experts with the following skills might be included in the team:

First, a number of specially-trained natural scientists, one to lead the inspection team and others to take part in the programme of visual inspection;

Second, qualified engineers to take part in the use of aerial and surface gamma-spectrometry inspection techniques;

Third, photographic interpretation specialists and geophysicists to take part in the use of broad spectrum photographic and magnetometer inspection techniques;

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Fourth, seismologists to engage in the seismic monitoring of after-shocks;

Fifth, physicists for the inspection of rock samples for crystal deformation.

Equipment for all operations undertaken by the inspection team would be supplied by the team, except heavy transportation vehicles such as trucks and helicopters, which would be supplied by the host country. As we have said, personnel of the inspection team could be accompanied by observers and other representatives designated by the host country to assure the proper functioning of the team in its territory and to ensure that no team member engaged in activity incompatible with the purpose of on-site inspection.

We believe that inspection teams should have a maximum -- a maximum -- of six weeks to complete their examination of the inspection area. That examination process would, in our view, include low-level helicopter flights throughout the inspection area to examine the area both visually and photographically for any evidence of a nuclear weapon test. In addition, members of the team would have access throughout the area for the purpose of surface inspection, and would be permitted entrance to any sub-surface cavities, such as mines, to look for evidence of a test. If a longer period of time were necessary for completion of the inspection process, we believe it could be extended by mutual agreement -- I repeat, by mutual agreement.

If the leader of the team decided that drilling was necessary, under our proposals he would have to notify the host country within five weeks from the start of inspection. That notification would indicate what additional persons and equipment would be required, their length of stay and their anticipated time of arrival. The host country would agree to facilitate the arrival of such equipment and personnel. Not later than thirty days after a team had completed its inspection the team leader, in our view, should be responsible for submitting a report on the findings of the team.

For the moment that concludes my delegation's preliminary discussion of the arrangements for the conduct of an on-site inspection. We sincerely hope that the Soviet representative, or representatives of allies of the Soviet Union in this Committee, will soon be prepared to offer comments on the broad issues of on-site inspection. It is our hope that what we have presented today will better enable them to do that.

Mr. BARRINGTON (Burma): On behalf of my delegation, I take the floor today to say a few words, first about the very recent French underground test conducted in the Sahara, and then, generally, about the nuclear-weapon tests which have taken place since 1 January of this year contrary to the demands of world public opinion voiced in General Assembly resolution 1762 (XVII) (ENDC/64).

The Committee will recall that I made a brief reference to the earlier United States tests in my statement of 3 March (ENDC/PV.105, pp.10,11). The nuclear-weapon test conducted last week in the Algerian Sahara was, in the view of my delegation, a double crime. First, it was a crime against humanity at large, as are all nuclear-weapon tests; secondly, it was a crime against the people and the Government of Algeria, on whose territory and despite whose protests it was conducted.

As a nuclear Power, France is a member of this Committee but, instead of taking its place in our midst and helping us to find a means to put an end to nuclear tests for ever, it insists on going its own way, reserving to itself the right to conduct nuclear tests whenever it considers them to be necessary. In so doing, France refused in this case to heed both world public opinion and officially-stated objections of the Government on whose territory the test was conducted. In those circumstances the delegation of Burma cannot help but join in the protests which have already been registered by several of our colleagues with regard to that nuclear test.

Burma's position on nuclear testing in general is well known. We are, we have always been, and we shall always be opposed to nuclear-weapon tests, whoever may conduct them, whatever the environment, and whatever the purpose. We have, we believe, already made it clear that in this matter we draw no distinction between underground tests and tests in other environments. That is why we have been unable to support a partial test-ban treaty covering tests only in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space. That is why we view with the utmost concern the continuation beyond 1 January 1963 of the United States, and now the French, nuclear tests.

We note that all the tests that have taken place since 1 January have been conducted underground. We take it that that is no accident; we assume that in some way it is intended to be a concession to public opinion. We regret to have to say that we cannot so regard it. The claim that underground tests do not

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result in radioactive contamination, even if it were true, would not sway us, since we believe that the political and psychological effects of an underground explosion are no less than those of an explosion in any other environment. But in fact we wonder whether even that claim is really true. After all, every nuclear explosion gives rise to radioactivity. Even if an explosion were fully contained below the surface -- and it seems that that cannot always be guaranteed the radioactive contamination only remains trapped to begin with. Who knows what happens to it ultimately? Might not some of it escape eventually into the atmosphere or come into contact with underground sources of water? Might we not find here also -- as the United States scientists eventually found about the United States high-altitude explosion held last year -- that the harm done is more extensive and lasting than that which had been foreseen? For those reasons my delegation remains unrepentant in its view that underground tests are as much to be condemned as tests in any other environment.

Let me repeat briefly what I said on the subject during the last session of the General Assembly (A/C.1/PV.1249, pp. 2 et seq.). In our view, the continuance of underground tests is nothing short of an invitation to others to test and, for reasons which I have already stated, not necessarily underground. If we are serious about stopping tests, then we, the States participating in this Conference, must set an example by refraining from all tests as long as our search for a mutually acceptable test-ban treaty continues.

As I have said before, nuclear tests in any form are, in our view, incompatible with serious negotiations on a test-ban treaty. They add considerably to our difficulties and give to our negotiations an air of unreality. They also encourage others who are not with us, either through choice or otherwise, to think that we are not serious and, to the extent that it lies within their capability, to test or to prepare for the day when it will be possible for them to test. It thus helps to keep open the door to the "nuclear club", the membership of which, according to President Kennedy's statement at his Press conference of 22 March 1963, might reach ten by 1970 and fifteen to twenty by 1975.

The fact of the matter is that we are at the present time engaged in negotiations, even if they tend to be slow and halting. Despite the statements which make the differences loom so large, the differences are, as I tried to

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explain in my last statement (ENDC/PV.105, pp. 6 et seq.), small compared with what has been agreed and agreed in a comparatively short time. Our great obsession with the small remaining differences is but natural, but it is also dangerous unless it is kept in perspective; and I submit that one of the surest ways of keeping things in perspective is for the nuclear Powers present here themselves to desist from nuclear testing of any kind and to use their influence to keep others from testing, while vigorously continuing the search for the means to bridge the small gap which remains to reach a nuclear test-ban agreement.

My delegation still refuses to believe that a suitable interim arrangement, offering reasonable protection to both sides, cannot be arrived at and arrived at quickly if the parties are really determined to reach such an agreement. We must stop further testing if all our past efforts are not to be jeopardized. Let us remember that the traditional testing season is almost upon us.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I believe that the statements we have heard this morning have been of great interest to our Committee, and they have certainly held our entire attention. Mr. Barrington has repeated his urgent and sincere appeals for a cessation of all tests in all environments. He knows that the Italian delegation too has never ceased calling for the conclusion as soon as possible of a dependable and adequately-guaranteed treaty which will provide the necessary security for all and will prevent any possibility of the spread of nuclear weapons. In the view of the Italian and Burmese delegations, such an agreement is becoming more urgent and more necessary every day. Our Committee must redouble its efforts to procure the conclusion of such an agreement.

Moreover, we have heard a very interesting statement by the United States delegation. Mr. Stelle has summed up very clearly the modalities which, in the United States delegation's opinion, should attend the conclusion of an agreement. He has asked for clear replies and indications from the Soviet delegation with regard to his proposals. Unfortunately, the Soviet delegation has so far refused to give the Committee its views on the problems outlined by the United States delegation. Moreover, the Soviet delegation has not yet thought fit to reply to the requests for clarification which have been made by my delegation too at earlier meetings.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

In spite of this silence and these negative replies, my delegation cannot accept this attitude as final, and continues to hope that the Soviet delegation will clarify its position and enter into fruitful negotiations with us. For this reason I should like this morning to put a few questions, very briefly, without any polemical aim but simply in order to try every possible means of breaking the deadlock and discovering upon which subjects the Soviet delegation would be prepared to exchange views with us.

In one of my earlier statements I said that the Committee should at least be able to interpret the letters sent by Mr. Khrushchev to Mr. Kennedy on the subject of tests (ENDC/73). As we know, these letters propose two or three inspections annually, but do not indicate when there would be two inspections and when there would be three. I do not believe that the choice between two and three inspections has been left to the parties. I do not think that the Soviet Government is saying to us: "We do not mind whether there are two or three inspections. Choose for yourselves." On the contrary, I imagine that there must be criteria and principles on the basis of which, in the view of the Soviet delegation, there would be two inspections or three. It would be interesting to know what are these principles and criteria which, in the view of the Soviet delegation, would determine the choice between two or three inspections. Would it depend upon the number of doubtful phenomena which take place during the year? Would it be determined by technical or political considerations, and in either case who would be responsible and who would be competent to take the decision?

The answer to these questions is of interest, not because the number of two or three inspections is acceptable but because, if we understood the Soviet point of view better, we should be able to engage in fruitful discussions. In order to reach agreement we must first understand each other's ideas. I therefore hope that the Soviet delegation will be good enough to provide explanations on the problems which I have indicated.

I should now like to ask another question. Regarding the methods of inspection, there is one point upon which there is doubtless agreement in principle: both parties recognize that inspections must rule out any possibility of espionage. We know that this point concerns to a large extent -- I would even say principally -- the Soviet delegation. Could we not immediately elaborate in a concrete and detailed fashion the precautions necessary to rule out all possibility of espionage?

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

The Soviet delegation cannot reply that this is a minor question, since it has always declared that the fear of espionage is, if not the only reason, at all events the principal reason which prevents acceptance of a larger number of inspections. This is therefore a major problem, and one must hope that, if we are able to agree on completely reliable methods and absolute guarantees in this matter, the Soviet delegation's attitude concerning the number of inspections may also change. If it were no longer in doubt and were completely reassured concerning any possibility of espionage, what reasons could it put forward for refusing more than three inspections?

I therefore ask the Soviet delegation whether it is prepared to draw up immediately a first concrete and detailed text committing the parties on the problem I have just mentioned. Proposals have already been made on this subject by both parties, and these proposals are also mentioned in the letters of Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Khrushchev. This morning Mr. Stelle also referred to the problem of guarantees against espionage. He said:

"In addition, the United States delegation has offered certain safeguards to the host country during the period an inspection team is in transit to the inspection area. We have also made it clear that we are willing to permit host country observers to accompany the team. Finally, we have proposed that sensitive defence installations could be excluded from the area which is to be inspected." (Supra, p. 7)

Does the Soviet delegation consider the guarantees offered by the United States delegation sufficient? What other guarantees against possible espionage activities does it consider necessary? Judging by Mr. Khrushchev's letter to Mr. Kennedy (ENDC/73), the guarantees against espionage proposed by the United States are sufficient and would, I am sure, at least constitute a good basis for the elaboration of an agreement on this very important problem. It is a question of developing these proposals, of giving them concrete form, and of embodying them in a document. Such a text, although certainly remaining a very partial agreement, would be of great value and, while reassuring the Soviet delegation on a delicate subject, would confirm the good faith of the Western delegations, who have certainly never dreamt of using the inspections for espionage purposes.

Allow me to ask the Soviet delegation if it is prepared to undertake that task. If possible, I should like to have a clear reply; and if the reply must be negative, although I very much hope that it will be affirmative, I would ask the Soviet delegation to give us its reasons.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Today the Soviet delegation would like to dwell once again on the state of affairs in the negotiations on the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests. When the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee parted for the Christmas and New Year recess in December 1962, there was great hope both in the Committee itself and in the world at large that after the recess an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests would at last be concluded.

There were very serious grounds for that hope. As everyone knows, the last recess of the Eighteen-Nation Committee took place at a time when the Soviet Union had made vigorous efforts to remove from the path to an agreement the obstacles raised by the Western Powers. The Soviet Union had put forward a compromise proposal on the main subject of disagreement -- inspection. We deem it necessary to stress very strongly that the Soviet Government considers, as it did before, that national means of detection are fully adequate for control over the observance on an agreement on the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests. We consider that there is no need for any international inspection for the purpose of control over such an agreement, because the effectiveness of national means of detection of nuclear explosions is at the present time such as to enable both the nuclear Powers and the non-nuclear States to exercise control over an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests without international on-site inspection. There will be even less need of inspection in the future, because the effectiveness of national means of control will continue to increase as a result of the rapid progress characteristic of the present time in all fields of science and technology, including seismology. The Soviet Government continues to stand firmly on its position in this regard.

However, being anxious to do everything possible to facilitate the achievement of agreement on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, the Soviet Government manifested its good will, and agreed to make a very great concession to the United States in this important question. The gist of this concession was that the Soviet Union declared its willingness to take into account the insistent wishes which had been repeatedly expressed, both officially and informally, in the course of the negotiations by representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom, including prominent United States scientists. These insistent requests and wishes were put to us during October, November and the beginning of December 1962. Their gist was that the Soviet Union should agree to a small inspection quota.

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Moreover, the aforesaid representatives quite definitely asked that the Soviet Union should agree to the inspection quota which it had itself officially named and which it had maintained up to 28 November 1961 -- that is, up to the time when the Soviet Union put forward a new proposal which did not provide for any international inspection. The circumstance that the representatives of the United States are now trying to deny this cannot do away with the fact that the agreement of the Soviet Union to two or three inspections a year is a positive reply to those insistent requests and specific wishes of the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom.

In other words, the Soviet Government, being anxious to achieve an agreement, accepted the number of inspections which had been proposed by the representatives of the United States, and which the representatives of the United Kingdom had also appealed to us to accept at official meetings of the Committee.

In view of the persistent attempts of the representatives of the United States to make out that the United States had never asked the Soviet Union to agree to three inspections a year, I venture to remind the Committee once again of the following facts. Although the representative of the United States attempts to deny these facts, they do not cease to exist on that account. Mr. Dean, at the time when he was still the official representative of the United States in the negotiations on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, during a meeting with Mr. Kuznetsov, the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, on 30 October 1962, in appealing to the Soviet Union to agree to a small inspection quota, declared that a quota of two to four inspections a year would fully satisfy the United States and would make it possible to come to an agreement very quickly.

In the second half of October 1962 the well-known United States scientist Professor Wiesner, during two informal meetings with the Soviet academician Fedorov in New York and in Washington, also asked that the Soviet Government should meet the wishes of the United States and agree to on-site inspection, and he said that a small quota of two to three inspections a year would open the way to agreement with the United States on this question.

Not only during informal meetings, but also during official meetings, at the session of the General Assembly and in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, the

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representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom appealed to the Soviet Union to agree precisely to two to three inspections. The representative of the United States to the United Nations, Mr. Stevenson, stated on 10 October 1962 in the First Committee of the General Assembly at its seventeenth session:

"... only one obstacle bars the path to the first great step toward nuclear sanity. The Soviet Union has not yet agreed to reaffirm the position which it took from 1958 until November 1961 --- that on-site inspection was a necessary element of any test ban agreement.

"... If the Soviet Union really wants an agreement to stop all testing for ever, we frankly cannot understand why some inspection at the site, which was acceptable to the Soviet Union a year ago, should not be acceptable today." (A/C.1/PV.1246, p.38-40)

As you see, the official representative of the United States to the United Nations, Mr. Stevenson, was referring to a quite definite number of inspections. He asked the Soviet Union to reaffirm the small number of on-site inspections which it had agreed to a year before. A year before, in comparison with the date of Mr. Stevenson's statement, meant 10 October 1961. At that time, as is well known, there was still standing the proposal submitted by the Soviet Union on 26 July 1960 at the two hundred and thirty-fourth meeting of the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests. At that meeting the Soviet delegation, on instructions from the Soviet Government, made an official statement to the effect that the Soviet Union agreed that a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests should contain --

"a provision to the effect that on the territory of the Soviet Union and likewise on the territories of the United States and the United Kingdom, and on territories under their jurisdiction, up to three visits per year may be made by inspection groups to each of the above-mentioned countries ..." (GEN/DNT/PV.234, p.15)

The Soviet Union has never named any other number of on-site inspections. Consequently, when the representatives of the United States or the United Kingdom

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appealed to the Soviet Union to revert to the number of inspections to which it had itself previously agreed, the only number that was meant was this figure of up to three inspections a year, and no other.

In October 1962, Mr. Stevenson said at the session of the General Assembly that the refusal of the Soviet Union to accept on-site inspection was the only obstacle to the conclusion of an agreement, and that this sole obstacle would be removed if the Soviet Union accepted the number of inspections which was acceptable to it one year previously. As you see, last December the Soviet Union, by agreeing to a quota of two to three inspections a year, removed this sole obstacle to which the representative of the United States, Mr. Stevenson, was referring.

United Kingdom representatives also made similar appeals to us. Speaking in the three-Power Sub-Committee in Geneva on 20 November 1962, Mr. Godber said

"We could have a complete comprehensive treaty, and all that is necessary for that is for the Soviet Union to revert -- not to accept anything new, but to revert -- to accepting something which a year ago, here in this building, our Soviet colleague renounced. In other words, to accept again the principle of obligatory on-site inspection. That is all we need -- a very small number of on-site inspections a year. If that were conceded by the Soviet Union, if it were to revert to the position it held until 28 November last year, then I believe we could quickly reach a comprehensive test ban." (ENDC/SC.1/PV.44, p.11)

As you see, the official representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Godber, also asked the Soviet Union to revert to the figure of three inspections a year, which, as he put it, would enable us quickly to reach a comprehensive test ban.

Two weeks later another United Kingdom representative, Sir Michael Wright, spoke no less definitely. In the Eighteen-Nation Committee on 5 December 1962 Sir Michael Wright stated the following

"... if the Soviet Government were willing today to take the position that it took for two years until almost exactly a year ago, a comprehensive treaty could no doubt be signed by 1 January 1963."

(ENDC/PV.87, p.8)

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

At the same meeting Sir Michael Wright made the following appeal to us:

"... let us sign a comprehensive treaty with the minimum amount of international verification still required, at least for the time being, and let this minimum be on the lines of Mr. Khrushchev's own earlier proposals."

(ibid., p.13)

He also said:

"In so far as this requires a political act by the Soviet Union, I would urge the Soviet Government to take that act." (ibid., p.12)

As you see, the representatives of the Western Powers insisted with a good deal of stubbornness that the Soviet Union should take a political act -- that is, give its agreement to the carrying out of up to three inspections a year -- and then the Western Powers would sign a comprehensive treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. And they obtained this agreement on the part of the Soviet Union. But what was the response of the Western Powers, the response of the United States, to that political act on the part of the Soviet Union? In response we were met, as had happened several times in the past, with the Western Powers' repudiation of their own words and their own proposals. We were met with cynical attempts to exert pressure on the Soviet Union in the hope of securing further concessions, in particular an increased number of inspections -- something in which the United States intelligence agencies are so much interested.

At present the situation in regard to the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests is utterly clear and utterly simple. The Soviet Union, having shown its good will in regard to the main subject of disagreement, namely the question of inspections, has gone the whole way, the whole distance which separated the positions of the two sides. By agreeing to two to three inspections a year, the Soviet Union has fulfilled the requirement, or the condition, put forward by the United States for the conclusion of an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. However, instead of grasping the hand extended to it by the Soviet Union, the United States at the last moment changed its position and began to move backwards, repudiating its own words and demanding that the Soviet Union should make further concessions. As a result of this there was no agreement.

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The representatives of the United States, while refusing to settle the main question which has so far been the subject of differences preventing agreement -- the question of the quota of inspections, as well as the question of the number of automatic seismic stations -- are at the same time trying persistently to impose on the Committee a discussion of technical details. It is precisely in this direction that the efforts of the representative of the United States, Mr. Stelle, and of its Western allies have been concentrated at recent meetings. We are now faced with a new manoeuvre by the Western Powers aimed at still further complicating the situation in the negotiations.

Quite recently, before the Soviet Government had agreed to the carrying out of two to three inspections, the Western representatives had no doubts as to what inspection was. There was no suggestion of any mysterious lack of understanding on this question in the extracts I have just quoted from the statements of Mr. Stevenson, Mr. Godber and Sir Michael Wright, or in the informal proposals of Mr. Dean and Professor Wiesner. One could recall a number of statements by representatives of the Western nuclear Powers in which they categorically emphasized that the only obstacle to agreement was the difference between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers in that the Soviet Union, relying on the effectiveness of national means of control, saw no need for on-site inspection, whereas the Western Powers insisted that a test-ban treaty should stipulate a small quota of inspections, which the Soviet Union had previously accepted, namely two to three inspections a year.

Now, as a result of the agreement of the Soviet Union to this principle of a quota of inspections, the obstacle which the Western representatives themselves had described as the only basic one has disappeared. Yet the Western representatives now have doubts as to whether the Western Powers understand at all what inspection is. The artificial nature of these doubts is obvious. All these doubts are merely an attempt to find additional arguments in order to divert the attention of the Committee from the solution of the main questions -- the size of the inspection quota and the number of automatic seismic stations -- and to involve the Committee in a maze of technical discussions. The United States representatives continue to maintain the untenable and completely-discredited position that the question of the number of

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inspections should be decided in relation to the number of earthquakes. It is beyond dispute, however, that the question of inspection must be solved in a spirit of political compromise. If the United States and its representatives ceased their attempts to impose a different solution of the problem of inspections, this problem could be regarded as solved.

The representative of the United States, Mr. Stelle, made the following statement on 18 March:

"The number of two to three on-site inspections has never been, and is not, acceptable to the United States." (ENDC/PV.110, p.34)

But he immediately added:

"We believe that a discussion of modalities -- a wider agreement on the broad arrangements for on-site inspection -- might make agreement on numbers easier." (ibid.)

If by this remark Mr. Stelle meant that the achievement of agreement on the modalities of on-site inspections would enable the United States to accept the figure of two to three on-site inspections a year, then what is the trouble? State it officially in our meeting, Mr. Stelle. Confirm Mr. Stelle, that the United States is prepared to accept the figure of two to three inspections; if you wish, you can even make a reservation to the effect that your acceptance of this quota of inspections is conditional and depends on the achievement of agreement on the modalities of inspection. If that is all the difficulty amounts to, then it seems to us that on this point we should be able to find a possibility for progress in our negotiations.

Therefore we earnestly request the United States representative, Mr. Stelle, to confirm that we are right in interpreting in this way the remark he made at the one hundred and tenth meeting. We are sure that confirmation of this point by Mr. Stelle will open up before the Committee favourable prospects for progress and speedy agreement in our negotiations.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): This morning we have again reverted to our discussion of nuclear tests, and our United States colleague has given some further details and thoughts of the United States and the United Kingdom on certain of the modalities.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

I listened very carefully to the remarks made by our Burmese colleague, whose point of view with regard to all testing I understand very clearly. He has been consistent throughout, in his approach to this question, in feeling that underground tests should be equated with others. I think it is fair to say that that has not been the view of all the delegations at this Conference. Indeed, at one stage last year both nuclear sides were being pressed very hard to agree to a partial treaty so as to remove the very real risks attendant on atmospheric testing. It was in response to those requests that the United Kingdom and the United States put forward their partial draft treaty (ENDC/59) last August. As I say, I understand the Burmese point of view. I would only say to our Burmese colleague that there is this other attitude. Undoubtedly the whole aspect of atmospheric testing has loomed much larger in the public concern throughout the world because of the closer relationship to health hazards. I noticed that the representative of Burma made the point that there could be health hazards in relation to other explosions; but I think even he would agree that they must be very considerably less than those appertaining to atmospheric explosions.

I have always held the view that, if we could have achieved a partial agreement on terms acceptable to both sides, that in itself would have been a stimulus towards getting the complete agreement which I have always believed we must attain. One of my own themes at this Conference has been that if we can get agreement in some areas it helps us on to agreement in others. So I still regret that it was not possible to conclude the partial agreement which we offered in August last year, and which indeed is still available. And, having in mind the considerations which our Burmese colleague has put forward, we also at that time put forward our comprehensive treaty (ENDC/58), and it is the most ardent wish of the United Kingdom that we shall achieve a complete ban on all testing at the earliest possible moment.

As for our Soviet colleague, I must admit I was a little surprised this morning that he took up the time of the Conference once more with a repetition of arguments

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and quotations which have been given round this table a number of times already, if not by him then by some of his friends. All those arguments have been clearly dealt with time and time again. All the quotations from Western spokesmen designed to show that in fact we have now changed our position have been so abundantly shown to be incorrect that I do not see the point in going into any detail to refute them once again. All the refutations are on record, and it seems to me to be an indication of the lack of material for serious argument that our Soviet colleague must have if he chooses to rake over these old embers again.

The only point I would put to him in reply is that, if that was the Soviet feeling, then surely the position must have been clarified absolutely and completely in the very first response which President Kennedy made to Chairman Khrushchev's communication to him (ENDC/73) at the end of last year; because in his letter of 28 December 1962 (ENDC/74) President Kennedy immediately took up the point in Chairman Khrushchev's letter and made it quite clear that the Western position was not as Mr. Khrushchev had implied in his letter, and that the smallest figure that had been mentioned by Western representatives was between eight and ten.

Subsequent to that -- and this is important -- Mr. Khrushchev agreed to discussions going forward, and sent his representatives to Washington and New York to discuss privately with the United States, and later with the United States and the United Kingdom, on the basis of that reply which he received from President Kennedy. Therefore what is the point of going over these matters again when they were set out so clearly by President Kennedy? It seems to me it must only be an indication that our Soviet colleagues are seeking to blur the issue here once more. I am sorry to have to say that, but I can see no other reason. I do hope our Soviet colleague will not try to lead us into those paths again, because, frankly, I do not think it helps us forward.

In his speech this morning our Soviet colleague reminded us again -- as if we needed reminding again -- of the Soviet Union's position, which is that it is prepared to accept two or three inspections a year on Soviet territory. Of course the Western

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position in relation to that is quite clearly known: it is that the smallest number which we have felt able to offer, on the evidence at present available to us, has been the figure of seven inspections a year. Our figure is based on the scientific assessment of the number of unidentified events which still remain, according to our best information, in relation to the Soviet territory, and of course in relation to Western territory as well.

The Soviet Union, it is true, has also offered a detection system which is based on a list of national detection stations, coupled with three automatic stations on the territories of each of the nuclear Powers. But here again our difficulty is that the Soviet Union is apparently not prepared to elaborate on that proposal either, even to the extent of explaining at least what it means by the term "automatic station". The Western position in relation to the automatic stations, as in relation to other matters in connexion with the treaty, is that our offers are made subject to full discussion, agreement and understanding concerning what these matters which we are discussing are. If it is a question of automatic stations, then clearly we ought to be ready to discuss what would go into such a station -- what it would comprise -- so that at least we know that we are talking about the same thing.

That is our very real difficulty at the present time. We have made certain offers in connexion with which we are prepared to discuss details; and if we could get agreement on the basic underlying position on those matters, then I should have thought that it would have simplified our major problem -- and I do not deny for a moment that it is a major problem -- of agreement on numbers. Thus we have sought to explain as fully as we could to the Conference what the Western position is, not only on numbers but on modalities as well. We have, after all, put all our cards on the table. Our Soviet colleague plays his card game rather differently; he makes his bid and then claims the game without even showing us what is in his hand. That is not the way in which we feel that we can usefully conduct such a game.

What justification does the Soviet Union offer for its attitude? It says that the issue now is basically political. It suggests that there is all the scientific evidence which we should want available to justify a treaty, even one

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based on no on-site inspection at all. In other words, it suggests that existing detection systems are perfectly adequate to detect, to locate and to identify all events which might reasonably be suspected of being nuclear explosions. At the same time the Soviet representatives say they recognize that there are many people in the West who are not convinced of that proposition, and who therefore would be opposed to a nuclear test-ban treaty which did not involve some measure of supervision.

That brings one back to the key point of on-site inspection. The Soviet Union says that it recognizes that: it says that it recognizes that a treaty, if it is to be ratified by democratic processes in the West, must be such as to give the West some measure of confidence. It was a very definite gain, I think, when our Soviet colleagues did recognize that once more; and that was the reason we warmly welcomed their reacceptance of the principle of on-site inspection. So, with that in mind, the Soviet Union says that it has made its offer of two to three inspections a year, and three automatic seismic stations, whose function would be to check on the operation of the national detection system. It says that its offer is a political gesture and is designed to take account of the political difficulties in the West. However, that is really the crux of the problem. I think that the Soviet Government has still not really understood where our difficulties lie, and why they arise.

If confidence is to be created among responsible people in the West -- people who represent the vast majority who want a nuclear test-ban treaty -- then those people have to be told what the grounds for confidence are. And that brings us to the question of probability; the probability of identifying -- not only of detecting, but also of identifying -- seismic events. That involves various questions. It involves the probable number of seismic events each year in the territories of the nuclear Powers; it involves the probable number of those events which can be identified as natural events, and it involves the capacity of existing, or indeed of projected, detection techniques to detect, to locate and to identify. In fact, what we are concerned with here is not exact figures but probabilities.

If we are indeed talking about probabilities, then we must have evidence on which to base our discussion. It really is no use just making unsubstantiated

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assertions. This is really where we miss so much the agreed background which we had to our earlier discussions in the previous three-Power Conference, when, right up to the autumn of 1961, we had an agreed basis contained in the Experts' Report of 1958 (EXP/NUC/28). The Soviet Union subsequently rejected that; and it is because we have not that agreed scientific background that many of our present difficulties exist. That, incidentally, is one reason why the United Kingdom delegation has on many occasions suggested getting some of our scientific experts together again. Indeed, when they meet unofficially, as happens from time to time at meetings such as those held by the Pugwash group, we sometimes do get interesting suggestions emerging from them. But it is the lack of official collective scientific discussion which I think has definitely hampered us.

Thus we come back to the whole question of exchanging information in some form or other and trying to evaluate it, and doing so in a spirit of co-operation. We on our side have made all the information available as we have obtained it; and we have offered to discuss it. Our attitude in negotiations for a test ban has always been based on the best and the latest scientific information available to us. We have carried out research, and of course our United States colleagues have done so to a greater degree; and as the results have become available we have been prepared to modify our position to take account of them. That has been the background against which we have been able consistently to reduce our request for on-site inspection over a considerable period of time and to bring it down to its present figure of seven.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has not made available to us information which it alleges that it has; nor has it been prepared to co-operate in any joint research. Indeed, I am afraid it has really done less than that, because it has recently refused even to discuss the information which we have made available. It has merely continued to assert that information about present detection techniques is perfectly adequate both to detect and to identify all events which might be suspected of being nuclear events. A mere reiteration of assertion in that form really does not help; and I appeal once more to our Soviet colleagues. I suggest that the best way to settle the matter would in fact be to try to get agreement on the scientific background to the question, and on the actual number of unidentified events which still remain.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

In spite of the refusal to co-operate, we in the West have gone forward steadily and have refused to be discouraged. We have made a judgement on what we think is necessary against the background of our assessment of existing and projected detection capabilities in order to create confidence. I come back to that word "confidence", which I emphasized earlier. We have made our assessment of the number of unidentified events which we think might remain in any one year on the territories of the nuclear Powers, and we have made our assessment of how many events we think it would be necessary to inspect in order to create confidence. We have gone further; we have said that in our view confidence would be established only if inspections were carried out in a certain way.

Our Soviet colleague took us to task this morning for referring again to the question of how inspections would be carried out; but surely, if anyone is to blame, it is the Soviet Union, because we tried repeatedly throughout last year in the nuclear test-ban Sub-Committee to draw the Soviet delegation into discussion on those matters so that we could be quite sure that we were thinking of the same things. It is perfectly true that in the discussions at the previous three-Power Conference we did reach a measure of agreement on very considerable aspects of this matter; but we never had endorsement of the position exactly as we put it, and we still think it would be helpful if we were to discuss the various modalities and get agreement on them.

That would leave outstanding only the major issue of numbers. Our Soviet colleague tells us that if we reached agreement on numbers all the other things would automatically follow. I hope he is right; but it is leaving a great deal to chance, and it would indeed be a bitter disappointment if finally we were able to achieve agreement on numbers and then found that there was a misunderstanding again between the two sides in relation to what we really thought about the way in which inspections should be carried out.

We have seen how one misunderstanding -- if that is what it was -- has caused difficulty recently. Mr. Tsarapkin reminded us again this morning of what the Soviet Union thought the Western position might have been. It may be that a genuine misunderstanding arose there; but then a genuine misunderstanding could arise again on what exactly would be the way in which an inspection would be carried out. I still do not understand why the Soviet Union is so determined to refuse even to discuss those other issues.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

However, we have gone to some lengths in seeking to explain what we have in mind in that connexion. So, once more, we have put our cards on the table, and we have invited examination of them. We have said that we are prepared to take criticism into account, but that we think that if our general ideas were accepted we should then be in a better position to achieve final agreement. But we still get no response from the Soviet Union. Mr. Tsarapkin continues to tell us that the decision on numbers is purely political and must be settled before we talk about anything else. I have failed on many occasions to explain our view on that question. We have both agreed that there should be a quota of inspections, and any quota must be a political decision; but in our case it is a political decision based upon scientific assessment. The Soviet position, offering three inspections, is a political position pure and simple -- a political decision in a vacuum; but our number must take account of our best scientific information if we are to carry with us the confidence of our own peoples that a treaty, once entered into, would be adequately supervised.

That is the basic Western position, which I think must be acknowledged by everyone round this table. Therefore the political element is really the element of confidence; and unless we have confidence in an agreement, that agreement can have no political force. We cannot have confidence unless we know that the agreement is soundly based, and we must ask our Soviet colleague to let us be the judge of what does or what does not create confidence in our own countries. I recognize that Mr. Tsarapkin is a man of great ability; but to know what creates confidence in a Western democracy does require some knowledge of how our system works; and the Soviet system is not quite identical with our own. Therefore I suggest that it is relevant to bring out that point, to show the difference in our approach to these matters.

We cannot accept that we should be told that a Soviet gesture involving a reversion to a number of inspections proposed by the Soviet Union a long while ago, and maintained by it until about a year and a half ago, should be enough to enable us to sign a treaty tomorrow. When the Soviet Union was making its offer prior to a year and a half ago, we knew what we were talking about when we spoke of inspections.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

As I said earlier, we had more or less reached agreement on the main aspects of that question, although there were some items upon which we had not reached agreement. But now we do not know what we are talking about when we speak of inspections, because we do not know whether the Soviet Union adheres to the position it then took or whether it has changed its position in relation to that question, as it has done in relation to others. The Soviet delegation has never told us since we started in this Conference.

Therefore, I do once more beg Mr. Tsarapkin to put just a few of his cards on the table for a change. Let him say what he is offering before he asks us to discuss it, let alone accept it. That surely cannot be too difficult for him. He has told us time and again that if we were to accept his numbers we could start discussion tomorrow. That must mean that he has some idea of what his Government's intention is with regard to the other matters -- the modalities. If he has that knowledge, then I cannot understand how any harm could be done to the Soviet position by agreeing to discuss those other matters and to reach agreement on them at this time. We should then know far more clearly what the Soviet position was. I should have thought that, as one more step to try to get things moving again, that really was not too much to ask of the Soviet Union at the present time.

Recently I have been back in my own country for a few days, and while I was there many people asked me why it was not possible to reach agreement now that the positions seemed to have become so much closer together. I had to say that, while I still hoped desperately that we should soon obtain agreement, I was discouraged because of the rigidity of the Soviet position. The United Kingdom and the United States over the recent weeks have shown abundantly their own flexibility, their willingness to tackle the question in different ways, their willingness to discuss all these matters, and their willingness to consider any compromise which the Soviet Union might care to put forward. But the West has met with absolute and complete rigidity as opposed to its own flexibility. One cannot hope to complete a negotiation successfully on that basis of absolute rigidity. I do beg the Soviet Union once more really to understand the Western position, and if it is able to accept the number of two or three on-site inspections, I cannot understand why it is unable to accept those few more inspections necessary to reach agreement.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

I say that because of the very reasons advanced by the Soviet Union for putting forward its number of inspections. As I indicated earlier, Mr. Tsarapkin says that it is purely for political reasons, a gesture to help the West. If it were based on a scientific appreciation, as the Western position is, then obviously one would have to take account of that situation. But if in fact it is purely a political gesture, then I should have thought that a very few more inspections would make no difference whatsoever to the Soviet position. We do not hear so much now about espionage, and I am very glad that we do not, because I always thought that a very poor argument. Obviously, if the Soviet Union can accept three on-site inspections a year, then, from the point of view of espionage, to accept the very few more could mean nothing to it. I have never felt the espionage argument to be a strong one and, as I say, I am glad it is not being advanced now.

But having come as near as we have now, we do have a duty to find some way in which we can reconcile our difference. That is not going to be done by going back into past history, as our Soviet colleague did this morning, trying to justify the Soviet position. It is going to be done by looking at the positions of the two sides now and seeing where we can best try to bridge the gap. It is in that spirit that I speak this morning, and I hope that we shall eventually be able to solve this very difficult problem.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): The Soviet representative has again today repeated at great length Soviet claims that, as he said this morning, last fall the United States official representatives had clearly and definitely said that the number of two to three on-site inspections would be acceptable to the United States. He quoted several people. As the representative of the United Kingdom has already said, these Soviet claims have been refuted more than once in our Committee.

For the convenience of representatives I should like to call attention to the record of one of the most important of those inaccurate Soviet claims, namely, that having to do with private conversations held last autumn in New York between Mr. Dean and First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov. The record of the conversation between Mr. Dean and Mr. Kuznetsov has been laid before this Committee by the United States delegation. I refer the Committee to the verbatim record of the one hundred and fourth meeting. At that time Mr. Foster said:

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

"The Soviet delegation has alleged, in presenting its position on on-site inspection, that Mr. Arthur H. Dean, at some point during informal discussions with Mr. Kuznetsov in New York last autumn, suggested as acceptable two to four on-site inspections annually. That is not the case. Here is the record." (ENDC/PV.104, p.19)

Mr. Foster went on to give the record of the conversations of 30 October, and said that the Soviet claim that Mr. Dean offered two to four inspections on 30 October was inaccurate. Mr. Foster gave also the record of the conversation of 7 November, after which he repeated that there were no grounds for doubt about the numbers mentioned by Mr. Dean, Mr. Dean having given those numbers as eight to ten.

Mr. Foster went on to say:

"... and that makes subsequent claims by Soviet representatives, that on 30 October, Mr. Dean had in fact mentioned the two to four figure quite surprising." (ibid, p.20)

I call attention to the record of those particular conversations as most important, because it was to the meeting of 30 October that Mr. Khrushchev referred in his letter of 19 December last to the President of the United States, when he said:

"We have noted that on 30 October 1962, in discussions held in New York with Mr. V.V. Kuznetsov, the First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, your representative, Ambassador Dean, said that in the opinion of the United States Government 2-4 on-site inspections a year in the territory of the Soviet Union would be sufficient."

(ENDC/73, p.4)

Obviously the fact that that statement occurs in a letter of Mr. Khrushchev's makes it important. But, as Mr. Godber has already made clear, President Kennedy in his answer to that letter on 28 December made the situation quite plain. He said:

"With respect to the number of on-site inspections there appears to have been some misunderstanding. Your impression seems to be that Ambassador Dean told Deputy Minister Kuznetsov that the United States might be prepared to accept an annual number of on-site inspections between two and four. Ambassador Dean advises me that the only number which he mentioned in his discussions with Deputy Minister Kuznetsov

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

was a number between eight and ten. This represented a substantial decrease in the request of the United States as we had previously been insisting upon a number between twelve and twenty. I had hoped that the Soviet Union would match this motion on the part of the United States by an equivalent motion in the figure of two or three on-site inspections which it had some time ago indicated it might allow."

(ENDC/74,* p.2)

It is clear that, when the Soviet representatives — Mr. Tsarapkin among them — came to New York and Washington, President Kennedy had cleared away any misunderstanding that there might have been; and we made that abundantly clear to the Soviet representatives again in our private talks in New York and Washington before the reconvening of this Committee. So whatever may or may not have been said last autumn — and we have put into the record what was said — there was no room, and there is no room, for any Soviet misunderstanding of what was said or of what the United States position was, and is.

Today Mr. Tsarapkin quoted (Supra, p.21) a remark that I made at a recent meeting, when I said that agreement on arrangements for on-site inspection would make an agreement on the number of on-site inspections easier. He asked whether that meant that, if there were agreement on arrangements for inspections, the United States would accept two to three on-site inspections. In order to avoid any further misunderstandings, I hasten to tell Mr. Tsarapkin that the number of two to three on-site inspections has been and is unacceptable to the United States, but that agreement on modalities would make agreement on numbers easier.

The Committee will recall that in a private conversation, which has since been reported to the Committee (ENDC/PV.102, p.24), Mr. Foster proposed to the Soviet representatives a lower number than eight to ten. He proposed the figure of seven on-site inspections, but he made that figure conditional upon Soviet agreement in principle to the kind of inspection arrangements which he outlined for Mr. Kuznetsov and which we have subsequently outlined for the Committee. Agreement on modalities would make agreement on numbers easier.

However, I think that, with our United Kingdom colleague, I must ask what lies behind this constant reiteration by the Soviet delegation of convincingly-refuted

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

claims concerning the United States position on numbers last autumn. Mr. Godber has said that it obscures our discussions, and it does; but I think the reason perhaps lies deeper. That is the Soviet position now on our negotiations for a test-ban treaty? It is that the United States and the United Kingdom must accept the figure of two to three on-site inspections before there can be any negotiation, or even any discussion, of any of the other major elements of a treaty.

The Soviet Union knows that the figure of two to three on-site inspections a year is not acceptable to the United States. It cannot pretend that its position in these negotiations is tenable, because its position is simply this: "Before we talk about anything else, you must accept the figure which you have said you do not accept". So, in a desperate attempt to have some shred of substance for the Soviet position, the Soviet representatives continue to repeat the tired statement that the United States once indicated that two to three inspections might be acceptable, and that therefore there might be some hope that that number is acceptable. That number is not acceptable to the United States, and the sooner the Soviet Union ceases trying to justify its untenable position by the repetition of stale and unwarranted claims and allegations, the sooner we can move forward to real negotiations; and I hope very much that that day will be soon indeed.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I should like to say a few words in connexion with what the representative of the United States has just said. Mr. Stelle is again insisting on his point of view, which amounts to saying that the United States cannot accept to agree first on the question of the inspection quota without knowing what the technical details and modalities of on-site inspection should be. Such a position is unconvincing and untenable, because nobody obliges you to sign an agreement before you have agreed with us and with the other parties to the agreement on the technical details relating to the method of carrying out on-site inspection.

You are simply beating on an open door. After all, there was a time — and you, Mr. Stelle, should remember it — when at the end of 1958 we worked out

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together a major fundamental article which prohibited the conducting of nuclear-weapon tests. We and you first accepted and agreed on that article, and it was only after doing so that we started to agree on the details of the agreement. At that time you did not refuse to reach agreement with us on that article before the details of the agreement were agreed upon. The situation now is a similar one. Then why do you now refuse to reach agreement on the question of the inspection quota, saying that it is first necessary to know the details?

If we turn to our past experience, that experience shows the complete inconsistency of the position taken by the United States. Today Mr. Godber and Mr. Stelle, in spite of all their attempts, have in fact been unable to refute the facts I adduced, which confirm beyond dispute that the Western representatives had asked the Soviet Union to accept a small quota of inspections — two to three inspections a year. That cannot be denied. Mr. Stelle has tried with particular insistence to deny in this Committee the fact — I stress the word "fact" — of the statement made by Mr. Arthur Dean in a conversation with First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov on 30 October 1962 to the effect that the United States might be satisfied with two to four inspections.

True, on this question it is easy for you to adopt the position of a flat denial. How can it be verified? There were no verbatim records. That is just what you are counting on. It is typical, however, that in Mr. Stevenson's statement, in Mr. Godber's statement in the Sub-Committee, and in Sir Michael Wright's statement in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, the Western representatives could say nothing, because no denial is possible; the verbatim records exist and I have referred to them. Everything I have said is completely in accordance with what is written in the verbatim records of our Conference. You have also been unable to say anything in regard to Professor Wiesner's proposal; that too is a fact and there are living witnesses to confirm it.

I must point out that the stubborn denial of earlier proposals, even though they were made informally by the United States, merely shows that the United States has changed its position. This explains the stubborn denial of the facts, but the facts have not ceased to exist on account of

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

that denial; they still exist. Incidentally, I should like to remind Mr. Stelle here that, when we conducted negotiations with Mr. Foster in New York and Washington in January, it is characteristic that in replying to our reference to that conversation between Mr. Dean and Mr. Kuznetsov, Mr. Foster denied it very cautiously. He told us that Mr. Dean, you see, was not authorized to name any other figure except the one named by United States representatives at official meetings. That was the first version of your denials. As time went on, the facts became blurred, time obliterated their clear outlines, new more decisive versions of the denials appeared in which even the very fact of the statement made by Mr. Dean was denied. So much by way of clarification.

Today's statement by the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Godber has clearly shown that he has taken the position of refusing to settle the question of the number of inspections on the basis of a political decision and as a political compromise. The United Kingdom representative continues to maintain the so-called technical approach to the solution of this political problem --- that is, an approach which for nearly five years has kept our negotiations in a deadlock, has given rise to one difference after another, and has prevented the achievement of agreement. It is obvious that the approach to the question of inspection suggested by the United Kingdom Prime Minister, Mr. Macmillan, during his visit to Moscow in February 1959, is not to the liking of the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Godber. Already at that time the United Kingdom Prime Minister, Mr. Macmillan, showed sufficient foresight, common sense and political wisdom to understand that an agreement on the basis of a political compromise creates confidence even in the so-called Western democratic world. I have just used the words employed by Mr. Godber at this morning's meeting (Supra, p. 28).

And so, as far back as February 1959, Mr. Macmillan in Moscow recognized that it was impossible to settle the question of inspection on a technical basis, with a technical approach; and he suggested at his meeting with the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Mr. Khrushchev, that the question of inspection be settled on a political basis and not on a technical basis or approach. We have the impression that precisely that understanding of the matter which the United Kingdom Prime Minister had as far back as February 1959, is unfortunately lacking in the United Kingdom representative,

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

Mr. Godber, four years later. I would earnestly request the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Godber, to follow in the steps of his Prime Minister in this regard and to support the political approach to the solution of this problem proposed by the United Kingdom Prime Minister in February 1959 in Moscow. If the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Godber, were to do so, I think that such a step on his part would be likely to have a certain positive influence on the position of the representative of the United States; that, of course, might help towards achieving agreement on the question which we are considering.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French) Today we have heard numerous statements on the problem of nuclear tests. We have heard declarations by the representatives of Burma, Italy, the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom. I do not wish to dwell on all these statements. I shall deal only with an argument which has been put forward here by the United Kingdom and the United States representatives. Realizing that the Soviet Union's analysis of the Western position and of their proposals of last autumn on the problem of a nuclear test ban -- an analysis amply supported by facts and quotations -- was such as to produce a profound and convincing impression upon all the delegations present, the Western representatives, since they could not produce any proofs, have only been able to read out old verbatim records which report simply what they have already said or put forward arguments devoid of value.

Upon what argument have the two Western representatives particularly insisted? They tell us that there has been an exchange of letters between the Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers, Mr. Khrushchev, and the President of the United States, Mr. Kennedy (ENDC/73, 74). In the reply which he sent to Mr. Khrushchev on the number of inspections, President Kennedy denied that the Western representatives had mentioned the figure of two or three inspections, and clearly defined the position of the United States as not accepting such a figure. This passage has been quoted here by the United States representative, and I have no reason to dwell upon it.

The Western representatives then asked why, in these circumstances, and in view of President Kennedy's position, the Soviet delegation went to Washington and to New York to

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

discuss the matter. That is a question designed to impress the representatives here and to give the idea that, after the Soviet delegation had received President Kennedy's reply, it had no need to go to Washington. Let us look at President Kennedy's reply. I shall not read the passage which has already been quoted by the United States representative, but I shall read the last paragraph of this letter:

"Notwithstanding these problems, I am encouraged by your letter.

I do not believe that any of the problems which I have raised are insoluble but they ought to be solved. I wonder how you think we might best proceed with these discussions which may require some technical development. It occurs to me that you might wish to have your representative meet with Mr. William C. Foster, the Director of our Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, at a mutually convenient place, such as New York or Geneva. I will be glad to have your suggestions. After talks have been held we will then be in a position to evaluate where we stand and continue our work together for an effective agreement ending all nuclear tests." (ENDC/74*, p.3)

How could the Soviet Union and the Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers refuse to discuss the problem when the President of the United States was suggesting that an attempt should be made to see where the two parties stood and suggested that the discussions involved might require some technical development? The Soviet Union went to New York and Washington for the specific purpose of satisfying the desire of the Western Powers, and particularly of the United States, for a clarification of the technical problems. Do you think that, without an immediate acceptance by the United States through its President of the figure proposed by the Soviet Union, it was wrong for us to go to New York and Washington? What should we have done? Should we have refused? It would have been said that the Soviet Union had refused a discussion, that it did not wish to meet the United States and the United Kingdom in order to study these questions, particularly those which the Western representatives now wish to discuss here.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

In order to give an idea of the argument which the Western Powers are now advancing, let us look at the reply given by Mr. Khrushchev to the President of the United States. The Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers says:

"As you see, we have taken a most important step to meet your views. The quota of inspections in the territory of each of the nuclear Powers which we are proposing is an adequate one. Your representatives themselves admitted during the negotiations that there is no need to verify all or a high proportion of significant suspicious events in order to deter States from attempting to violate the treaty. In this connexion, they mention an annual number of inspections which virtually coincides with the quota we are proposing." (ENDC/73*, p.8)

The Soviet Union thus insisted that the quota it proposed was entirely adequate. One might also turn the question of the Western representatives round and ask them why, when they knew that the Soviet Union was insisting on the figure indicated, they agreed to meet the Soviet representatives. One could certainly ask the same question on both sides. Basically, it was a matter of continuing the conversations, and the Soviet Union showed how much interest it attached to them as a means of reaching an agreement.

But there is more. In the last paragraph of his letter to the President of the United States, Premier Khrushchev said:

"You suggest in your communication, Mr. President, that our representatives should meet in New York or Geneva for a brief preliminary review of some of the problems you have raised. We have no objections to such a meeting being held between our representatives. The Soviet Government has designated for this purpose Mr. N. T. Fedorenko, Permanent Representative of the USSR to the United Nations and Mr. S. K. Tsarapkin, Representative of the USSR in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, who could meet your representative, Mr. William S. Foster. We take this decision in the belief that the meetings between our representatives should lead in the very near future to agreement being reached on outstanding questions ..." (Ibid., p.2)

(Mr. Tarabarov, Bulgaria)

There were certainly some outstanding questions, and, as far as the Soviet Union was concerned, these were precisely those technical questions, relating perhaps to the methods of inspection, which are being raised here by the Western representatives and which might have been settled in this review of all past conversations and negotiations, particularly as Chairman Khrushchev added:

"... so that when the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee resumes its work our representatives will be able to inform it that the way lies open to agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests." (ibid.)

Of course that is why the Soviet Union went to the United States to discuss outstanding questions, and particularly those technical questions which required clarification, in order to enable the delegations to bring the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests.

It is certainly easy enough to avoid replying to the arguments which have been put forward here by the Soviet delegation. It is also easy to say: "The statements which we made last autumn are no longer valid." That is just what the United States representative told us today. It is easy to say: "Perhaps last autumn we made statements which you did not sufficiently understand; perhaps there was even in those statements" -- we have heard this argument before -- "an error which we deeply regret. But later we stated that we could not accept two or three inspections."

But that is not an argument. Whenever it suits you, you can say that you do not wish to agree on two or three inspections, or on any other question. But that is not an argument, and it is certainly not a position which the delegations present here can easily accept. It is true that without your assent and acceptance no agreement can be reached on a test ban treaty. We accept this fact. All the delegations at this Conference have a real respect for the delegations representing the great Powers, and they are well aware that without the consent of the great Powers -- I mean the great nuclear Powers -- there will be no agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

But you cannot simply come to the Committee and say: "Yes; perhaps you have misunderstood certain statements which we have made; but now, after the discussion we have had on such-and-such a question, our position has become clear enough for you to understand it, and so we must examine what we wish to discuss, and not discuss the principal questions upon which you are insisting." We do not believe that such a situation can be accepted; nor do we believe that the United States and United Kingdom representatives were very convincing today when they said that, if we did not agree to the figures, we should not have taken part in the talks. Much more substantial arguments on this point are needed in order to allow us to decide how we are to proceed in future.

I believe that the best way to reach an agreement would certainly be to accept, as the Western Powers suggested in the past, the figure which has been put forward by the Soviet Union and which, as the Soviet representative showed today in his statement, is the outcome of suggestions made here officially and elsewhere informally. Later we could examine other questions of detail and other technical questions in order finally to reach an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests.

Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland): I think that today's meeting could have been important in the history of our negotiations; and I still believe that it might become an important meeting. We have heard a very important statement by the Soviet representative, which in our view could have opened the way to a fruitful discussion of the modalities and procedures for on-site inspection. I must admit I have been very disappointed by the statements made by the representatives both of the United States and the United Kingdom in response to the invitation issued by the Soviet representative.

I was particularly disappointed with the response of the United States representative. Until now I had understood his position to be that the numbers of on-site inspections were negotiable, in the broad sense of the term, provided that we could agree on the modalities and procedures of on-site inspection. If I understood him correctly this morning, he has now told us that in fact those numbers are not negotiable. I think we are entitled to draw the conclusion from his words that we are in fact faced with a double ultimatum: not only are we asked to accept the United States figure of seven on-site inspections, but, on top of that, we are told that that number is agreeable to the United States if we accept the modalities and procedures for on-site inspection the United States has put before this Committee.

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

I think that is the only logical conclusion we can draw; because otherwise it seems to me that the United States delegation should accept the premise that the numbers are negotiable in the broadest sense of the term, and its response to the invitation by the Soviet representative should have been a positive one. I should be very grateful to have a clear statement on this matter from the United States delegation. I think that the whole Committee will certainly be interested to know the exact position of the United States delegation.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): First, I should like to take up a remark made by the representative of Bulgaria. He ascribed to the United States representative the question why, after President Kennedy's letter had made it clear that the position of the United States on the number of inspections was the number of eight to ten, Soviet representatives came to New York and Washington. That question, was, I believe, in fact raised by Mr. Godber and, delighted as we would be to have him as a representative of the United States, I am not quite sure that Mr. Godber would accept that definition. As a matter of fact, Mr. Godber's question was one which we shared. We thought that the position was clear: we endeavoured to clarify it further after the Soviet representatives arrived for informal discussions in New York and Washington. But the important thing is that the position of the United States both there and here is clear, and cannot be misunderstood by the Soviet Union.

In response to the question of the representative of Poland, I need only say that the representative of the Soviet Union and the Government of the Soviet Union know that the number of two to three on-site inspections is not acceptable to the United States. As far as the United States is concerned, that number is not negotiable.

We have said that, depending on the arrangements, the numbers of on-site inspections which we had previously put forward as eight to ten were negotiable; and as specific evidence of that I again cite the fact that in private discussions, which have now been reported to this Committee (ENDC/PV.102, p.24), the United States said it was willing to come down to the figure of seven, provided that the general arrangements for on-site inspection described at that time to the representative of the Soviet Union were, in general, acceptable to the Soviet Union. We have not heard from the Soviet Union whether those arrangements are acceptable, or even whether there are parts of those arrangements which are unacceptable to the Soviet Union. We have heard no discussion one way or the other.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

The position is clear. The Soviet Union continues to demand acceptance of a number which it knows is not acceptable to the United States. The Soviet Union continues to refuse discussion of any other major issue dealing with the test-ban treaty until the United States submits to what can only be described as a clear Soviet ultimatum. It is high time that the Soviet Union should move off its present untenable position and let our negotiations proceed towards the successful end that all of us around this table hope they will reach.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I shall take no more than a moment to endorse entirely what our United States colleague has said; but in reply to the representative of Bulgaria, whose comments I always listen to with interest, I should just like to make two very brief points.

The first is that he seemed surprised that the West had not taken up and refuted the quotations given by the representative of the Soviet Union this morning in connexion with the Western position. I would say to him that the reason why we did not take it further than we did was because we — and I speak for my delegation — have a higher appreciation of the intelligence of our colleagues sitting round this table. I remember that Mr. Zorin used to say on occasion, "We are not children." I think that is true of all representatives sitting around this table. They are not children; and they will recall very clearly that both I and my United States colleague have in the past dealt in detail and at length with those allegations. I did not really think that it helped the Conference merely to repeat what has been said before.

The constant repetition by the representatives of the Eastern bloc here of the statement that in fact the West has misled them really does not help at all. The position is abundantly clear, but for the benefit of our Bulgarian colleague I should be happy to go through with him the verbatim records of the actual statements I have made in the past, if he would like to come along to see me; I shall have a very happy time showing them to him. I think that is really better than taking up the time of the Conference in restating positions which have been very fully explained to the Conference before.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

The second point related to the letter from President Kennedy and the second letter from Chairman Khrushchev on the question of figures. I rather thought that our Bulgarian colleague had failed to take the point which I tried to make earlier. So far as President Kennedy's position is concerned, it was quite clear that he understood from the start what the Soviet position was; he was willing to have discussions, nevertheless, in the hope of getting some agreed position. Mr. Khrushchev apparently based his first letter on the figure which he had written in and which he understood to represent the Western position.

But the whole point was that, after having that corrected, the Soviet Union was still willing to participate in these discussions. So it is not an exact analogy to say, "Why did the President of the United States not refuse discussions thereafter?" The two positions are not analogous at all. In one case the position was clearly understood from the start: in the other case, apparently, it was not. But, when it was understood, Mr. Khrushchev was still happy for discussions to go forward. That is the difference, and that is why I think it is so pointless to keep referring once again to what the Western position was. However, if it were the wish of the Conference I should be very happy to read out again at great length the various speeches I have made on the subject.

Mr. TSIAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):

I cannot agree with the attempt to give an incorrect idea of the substance of the matter by referring to the correspondence exchanged between President Kennedy and the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Mr. Khrushchev. I must say that, in reply to President Kennedy's letter in which he said that there was apparently a misunderstanding, Mr. Khrushchev's letter of 7 January stated the following:

"... your representatives themselves admitted during the negotiations that there is no need to verify all or a high proportion of significant suspicious events in order to deter States from attempting to violate the treaty. In this connexion, they mention an annual number of inspections which virtually coincides with the quota we are proposing." (ENDC/73, p.8)

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

This is what was stated in Mr. Khrushchev's letter of 7 January 1963 to President Kennedy. Therefore, Mr. Godber, do not try to make out that President Kennedy stated in his letter that there had been a misunderstanding in regard to the inspection quota and that the Soviet Union had agreed with this point of view; that is not true. Mr. Khrushchev confirmed in the aforementioned letter that the representatives of the United States, in their talks with our representatives, had mentioned an annual number of inspections which virtually coincided with the quota we were proposing, namely, two to three inspections a year.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its one hundred and thirteenth plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Mbu, Minister of State and representative of Nigeria.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United States, Burma, Italy, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, Bulgaria and Poland.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Wednesday, 27 March 1963, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.

